Tang Wei, researcher Professor at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Soon after taking office, Trump announced his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, cut funding for the International Development Agency, restricted climate scientists, and even sought to repeal legislation that deemed carbon dioxide a pollutant, meanwhile completely relaxing environmental regulations. His policy approach was thorough, radical, and more assertive, sending significant signals. it is still too early to judge how far these policies will actually be implemented; however, the consequences have already become apparent. Thus , the international community is primarily adapting and adjusting in the following three ways.

First, the international community has generally expressed disappointment. The United States primarily exerts its leadership in climate governance through agenda-setting, financial support, and technological leadership. After Trump was elected, climate issues quickly lost the international attention they once commanded. International organizations, small island states, African countries, and various non-governmental organizations all expressed deep disappointment at COP29. Despite the widespread and dissatisfaction, no country or organization has publicly criticized, let alone condemnedpolicy reversal. This is because they all recognize that no single actor can make up for the U.S. withdrawal. One hand,in the additional emissions resulted by the his policy would currently lack sufficient offsets,the other hand The the main goal that developed countries would "lead" in raising $300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035, will be impossible to achieve.The six most influential U.S. banks have all exited the "Climate Finance Club," and market capital flowing into climate releated sectors obviously dwindled .

Second, major negotiating blocs are now more incentivized to scale back their original climate commitments. Driven by multiple factors including the Russia-Ukraine war and energy security, the EU's climate policy agenda is already on a downward trajectory. A notable decline in political will to fund multilateral mechanisms, a slowdown in the transition to electric vehicles, and a relaxation of fossil fuel phase-out deadlines. The carbon border adjustment mechanism may also face new obstacles. With the breakdown of Sino-U.S. climate cooperation and policy coordination, international pressure on China to take the lead has noticeably increased, but China should adhere to its long-held principles. Emerging economies like India and Brazil are also expected to adopt a similar approach. Multilateral agendas such as climate summits and methane reduction scheme, which were led or participated in by the United States, will become less active. Countries aligned with the U.S., such as Canada, Japan, and Australia, are clearly aligning their positions with Washington.. Indonesia, South Africa, and Vietnam in the "Energy Transition Partnership" (JETP) are encountering more difficulties. Without federal guidance and policy support, emission reductions and clean energy development on the state-levelalso significantly slow down. As supposed, the world should be transitioning from carbon-based economy to carbon neutrality and net-zero emissions as defining features of a new era..However, Trump fundamentally reversed this mindset, reframing net-zero not as a goal worthy of be pursued but as a burden on national development. This has prompted the Global South and even some Northern countries to reconsider how to balance climate priorities with economic development.

Third, the resilience of international climate governance remains. Despite a noticeable downgrade in the policy agenda and intensity of global climate governance, the system has not collapsed. This is evident in the continued robustness of the Paris Agreement framework, which has expanded its scope, strengthened the verification of national commitments, and advanced financial mechanisms. Cooperative efforts between China and the EU, China and Japan/South Korea, and China and African nations—along with broader initiatives in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America—have strengthened, as adaptation agendas or the development of multi-hazard early warning systems. Subnational actors, including U.S. states and cities, and urban networks like C40, continue to advance deep decarbonization and best practices. More importantly, clean energy industry , including electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines, are now seen as integral components of national energy security and core competitiveness. This suggests that when top-down approaches lose momentum, bottom-up approaches naturally play a greater role, to some extent which may be the only way to adapt to the polarized U.S. policy landscape.

Company: Institute of International Relations of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Contact Person: Tang Wei

Email: tangruc@126.com

Website: https://iir.sass.org.cn/

Telephone:15221990122

City: Shang Hai